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1
Introduction
In this tutorial, we introduce the Curry-Howard (proof-program) correspondence
which is usually restricted to intuitionistic logic.
We explain how to extend this correspondence to the whole of mathematics
and we build a simple suitable machine for this.
1st problem
Each mathematical proof must give a program which we can run in this machine.
2nd problem (specification problem)
Understand the behaviour of these programs
i.e. the specification associated with a given theorem.
The first problem is now completely solved, but the second is far from being so.
2
Usual λ-calculus
The λ-terms are defined as follows, from a given denumerable set of λ-variables :
• Each variable is a λ-term.
• If t is a λ-term and x a variable, then λx t is a term (abstraction).
• If t ,u are terms, then (t )u is a term (application).
Notations. ((t )u1) . . .un is also denoted by tu1 . . .un .
The substitution is denoted by t [u1/x1, . . . ,un/xn]
(replace, in t , each free occurrence of xi with ui ).
λ-calculus is very important in computer science, because it is the core of every
programming language.
It is a very nice structure, with many properties (Church-Rosser, standardization, . . . )
which has been deeply investigated.
But, in the following, nothing else than the definition above is used about λ-calculus.
3
A machine in symbolic form
The machine is the program side of the proof-program correspondence.
In these talks, I use only a machine in symbolic form,
not an explicit implementation.
We execute a process t ?pi ; t is (provisionally) a closed λ-term,
pi is a stack, that is a sequence t1 . t2 . . . tn .pi0 where
pi0 is a stack constant, i.e. a marker for the bottom of the stack.
We denote by t .pi the stack obtained by ”pushing” t on the top of the stack pi.
Execution rules for processes (weak head reduction of λ-calculus) :
tu?piÂ t ?u .pi (push)
λx t ?u .piÂ t [u/x]?pi (pop)
This symbolic machine will be used to follow the execution of programs
written in an extension of λ-calculus with new instructions.
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A machine in symbolic form (cont.)
We get a better approximation of a “real” machine by eliminating substitution.
The execution rules are a little more complicated (head linear reduction) :
λx1 . . .λxk tu? t1 . . . . . tk .piÂλx1 . . .λxk t ? t1 . . . . . tk .v .pi
with v = (λx1 . . .λxku)t1 . . . tk
(in particular, for k = 0, tu?piÂ t ?u .pi)
λx1 . . .λxk xi ? t1 . . . . . tk .piÂ ti ?pi.
It is necessary to add new instructions, because such simple machines
can only handle ordinary λ-terms, i.e. programs obtained from proofs
in pure intuitionistic logic.
Observe that some of these instructions will be incompatible with β-reduction.
Not a problem, because β-reduction plays no real role in the following.
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These two methods of execution are essentially equivalent.
For real machine implementation, we use head linear reduction
which is much more efficient. But weak head reduction is better for easy reading ;
I shall use it during this tutorial, and indicate, from time to time,
the small changes which are necessary for head linear reduction.
Observe that head linear reduction needs the introduction of combinators
or instructions, in order to avoid garbage.
For example, it is better to introduce a new fixpoint instruction Y
with the reduction rule : Y? t .piÂ t ?Yt .pi.
The usual Curry fixpoint Y =λ f A f A f with A f =λx( f )(x)x
would give the following (equivalent, but not very readable) result :
Y ? t .piÂ t ? ((λ f A f )t )(λ f A f )t .pi.
This phenomenon does not arise with weak head reduction.
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Intuitionistic Curry-Howard correspondence
Consider second order formulas with → and ∀ as the only logical symbols.
Intuitionistic natural deduction is given by the following usual rules :
A1, . . . ,Ak ` Ai
A1, . . . ,Ak ,A `B ⇒ A1, . . . ,Ak ` A→B
A1, . . . ,Ak ` A→B , A1, . . . ,Ak ` A ⇒ A1, . . . ,Ak `B
A1, . . . ,Ak ` A ⇒ A1, . . . ,Ak `∀x A and ∀X A
(if x,X are not free in A1, . . . ,Ak)
A1, . . . ,Ak `∀x A→ A[t ]
A1, . . . ,Ak `∀X A→ A[F/X x1 . . .xk]
(comprehension scheme)
Notations. Let X be a propositional variable (predicate of arity 0).
⊥ is defined as ∀X X (thus, ⊥→ F is a particular case of the compr. scheme).
∃Y {A1, . . . ,Ak} means ∀X [∀Y (A1, . . . ,Ak→ X )→ X ].
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Intuitionistic Curry-Howard correspondence (cont.)
These rules become rules for typing λ-terms, as follows :
x1:A1, . . . ,xk :Ak ` xi :Ai
x1:A1, . . . ,xk :Ak ,x:A ` t :B ⇒ x1:A1, . . . ,xk :Ak `λx t :A→B
x1:A1, . . . ,xk :Ak ` t :A→B , u:A ⇒ x1:A1, . . . ,xk :Ak ` tu:B
x1:A1, . . . ,xk :Ak ` t :A ⇒ x1:A1, . . . ,xk :Ak ` t :∀x A and t :∀X A
(if x,X are not free in A1, . . . ,Ak)
x1:A1, . . . ,xk :Ak `λx x:∀x A→ A[t ]
x1:A1, . . . ,xk :Ak `λx x:∀X A→ A[F/X x1 . . .xk]
(comprehension scheme)
In this way, we get programs from proofs in pure (i.e. without axioms)
intuitionistic logic. It is the very first step of our work.
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Realizability
We know that proofs in pure intuitionistic logic give λ-terms.
But pure intuitionistic, or even classical, logic is not sufficient
to write down mathematical proofs.
We need axioms, such as extensionality, infinity, choice, . . .
Axioms are not theorems, they have no proof !
How can we find suitable programs for them ?
The solution is given by the theory of classical realizability.
We define, for each mathematical formula Φ :
• the set of stacks which are against Φ, denoted by ‖Φ‖
• the set of closed terms t which realize Φ, which is written t ∥−Φ.
We first choose a set of processes, denoted by ⊥ , which is saturated, i.e.
t ?pi ∈⊥ , t ′?pi′Â t ?pi ⇒ t ′?pi′ ∈⊥
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Realizability (cont.)
Equivalently, we can choose the complement ⊥ c of ⊥ , which is closed by execution
i.e. t ?pi ∈⊥ c , t ?piÂ t ′?pi′ ⇒ t ′?pi′ ∈⊥ c
The set ‖Φ‖ and the property t ∥−Φ are defined by induction on the formula Φ.
They are connected as follows :
t ∥−Φ ⇔ (∀pi ∈ ‖Φ‖) t ?pi ∈⊥
There are three steps of induction, because our logical symbols are
the arrow : →, the first and second order universal quantifiers : ∀x , ∀X .
1. ‖Φ→Ψ‖ = {t .pi ; t ∥−Φ,pi ∈ ‖Ψ‖}.
In words : if the term t realizes the formula Φ
and the stack pi is against the formula Ψ
then the stack t .pi (push t on the top of pi) is against the formula Φ→Ψ.
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Realizability (cont.)
2. ‖∀xΦ(x)‖ =⋃{‖Φ(a)‖;a ∈N}
This means that the domain of first order variables is N.
In words : a stack is against ∀xΦ(x) if it is against Φ(a) for some integer a.
3. Let X be a predicate variable of arity k . Then
‖∀X Φ(X )‖ =⋃{‖Φ[X /X ]‖;X :Nk→P (Π)}
This means that the domain of k-ary predicate variables is P (Π)N
k
.
It follows that t ∥−∀xΦ(x) ⇔ (∀a ∈N) t ∥−Φ(a) and
t ∥−∀X Φ(X ) ⇔ (∀X ∈P (Π)Nk ) t ∥−Φ[X /X ]
We have defined ‖Φ‖ and t ∥−Φ for every closed second order formula Φ
with parameters. Parameters of arity k are functions X :Nk→P (Π).
A closed atomic formulas is X (n1, . . . ,nk). Its truth value is obvious.
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Realizability (cont.)
We see that realizability theory is exactly model theory, in which the truth value set
is P (Π) instead of {0,1}, Π being the set of stacks.
We are indeed considering “ standard ” second order models :
the domain of individuals is N
the domain for k-ary predicate variables is P (Π)N
k
(instead of {0,1}N
k
).
For each function f :Nk→N, we have the k-ary function symbol f
with its natural interpretation.
The truth values ; and Π are denoted by > and ⊥. Therefore :
t ∥−> for every term t ; t ∥−⊥ ⇒ t ∥−F for every F .
Warning. In our realizability models, the domain of variation of individual variables
is N. But, the usual 2-valued models we get from them are non-standard, i.e.
they contain non-standard integers and even individuals which are not integers at
all.
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The adequation lemma
In order to get a model, we have only to choose the saturated set ⊥ .
The case ⊥ =; is degenerate : we get back the usual two-valued model theory.
The lemma below is the analog of the soundness lemma for our notion of model.
It is an essential tool for the proof-program correspondence.
Adequation lemma.
If x1:Φ1, . . . ,xn:Φn ` t :Φ and if ti ∥−Φi (1≤ i ≤ n) then t [t1/x1, . . . , tn/xn] ∥−Φ.
In particular : If ` t :Φ then t ∥−Φ.
The proof is a simple induction on the length of the derivation of · · · ` t :Φ.
In the following, we shall more and more use semantic realizability t ∥−Φ
instead of syntactic typability ` t :Φ.
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The language of mathematics
The proof-program correspondence is well known for intuitionistic logic.
Now we have
Mathematics ≡ Classical logic + some axioms
that is Mathematics ≡ Intuitionistic logic + Peirce’s law + some axioms
For each axiom A , we choose a closed λ-term which realizes A , if there is one.
If not, we extend our machine with some new instruction which realizes A ,
if we can devise such an instruction.
Now, there are essentially two possible axiom systems for mathematics :
1. Analysis, i.e. second order classical logic with dependent choice.
2. ZFC, i.e. Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the full axiom of choice.
Thus, we now have many axioms to deal with.
First of all, we must settle the law of Peirce : ((A→⊥)→ A)→ A.
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Peirce’s law
We adapt to our machine the solution found by Tim Griffin in 1990.
We add to the λ-calculus an instruction denoted by cc. Its reduction rule is :
cc? t .piÂ t ?kpi .pi
kpi is a continuation, i.e. a pointer to a location where the stack pi is saved.
In our symbolic machine, it is simply a λ-constant, indexed by pi.
Its execution rule is kpi? t .pi′Â t ?pi.
Therefore cc saves the current stack and kpi restores it.
Using the theory of classical realizability, we show that cc ∥− (¬A→ A)→ A.
In this way, we extend the Curry-Howard correspondence to every proof
in pure (i.e. without axiom) classical logic : we now have the new typing rule
x1:A1, . . . ,xk :Ak ` cc:(¬A→ A)→ A
Let us check that cc ∥− (¬A→ A)→ A :
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Peirce’s law (cont.)
Take t ∥−¬A→ A and pi ∈ ‖A‖. For every u ∥−A, we have u?pi ∈⊥ , therefore
kpi?u .pi′ ∈⊥ for every stack pi′. Thus kpi ∥−A→⊥ and kpi .pi ∈ ‖¬A→ A‖.
It follows that t ?kpi .pi ∈⊥ thus cc? t .pi ∈⊥ . QED
This extended λ-calculus is called λc-calculus.
The set of closed λc-terms is denoted by Λc .
A closed λc-term which contains no continuation is called a proof-like term.
We say that the formula Φ is realized if there is a proof-like term τ such that
τ ∥−Φ for every choice of ⊥ . Thus :
• Every λc-term which comes from a proof is proof-like.
• If the axioms are realized, every provable formula is realized.
If ⊥ 6=;, then τ ∥−⊥ for some λc-term τ : take t ?pi ∈⊥ and τ= kpit .
Observe that it is not a proof-like term.
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A useful trick
We can define the truth value ‖V →Φ‖ when Φ is a truth value
(for example a closed formula with parameters) and V is any set of terms.
The definition is ‖V →Φ‖ = {v .pi; v ∈V ,pi ∈ ‖Φ‖}.
For example {ξ}→Φ and ¬V have truth values.
Theorem. Let Φ be a truth value and V a set of terms.
Then (V →Φ)↔ (¬Φ→¬V ) is (uniformly) realized :
λ f λk k◦ f ∥− (V →Φ)→ (¬Φ→¬V ) ;
λhλvccλk(h)kv ∥− (¬Φ→¬V )→ (V →Φ).
Theorem. Let X be a truth value and X−= {kpi; pi ∈ ‖X ‖}.
Then ¬X−↔ X is (uniformly) realized.
Indeed cc ∥−¬X−→ X and λxλy yx ∥−X →¬X−.
It follows that, in order to realize X ∨ A it is sufficient (but often much easier)
to realize X−→ A.
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First simple theorems
The choice of ⊥ is generally done according to the theorem Φ for which
we want to solve the specification problem. Let us take two simple examples.
Theorem. If θ comes from a proof of ∀X (X → X ) (with any realized axioms)
then θ? t .piÂ t ?pi i.e. θ behaves like λx x .
Proof. Take ⊥ = {p ; p Â t ?pi} and ‖X ‖ = {pi}.
Thus t ∥−X and θ? t .pi ∈⊥ . QED
Example : θ =λx ccλk kx .
Dual proof. Take ⊥ c = {p ; θ? t .piÂ p} and ‖X ‖ = {pi}.
Thus, θ? t .pi ∈⊥ c ; since pi ∈ ‖X ‖ and θ ∥−X → X , we have t 6∥−X
and therefore t ?pi ∈⊥ c . QED
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First simple theorems (cont.)
The formula Bool(x)≡∀X (X1,X0→ X x) is equivalent to x=1∨x=0.
Theorem. If θ comes from a proof of Bool(1), then θ? t .u .piÂ t ?pi
i.e. θ behaves like the boolean λxλy x .
Proof. Take ⊥ = {p ; p Â t ?pi}, ‖X1‖ = {pi} and ‖X0‖ =;= ‖>‖.
Thus t ∥−X1, u ∥−X0 and θ? t .u .pi ∈⊥ . QED
Dual proof. Take ⊥ c = {p ; θ? t .u .piÂ p}, ‖X1‖ = {pi} and ‖X0‖ =;= ‖>‖. We have
u ∥−X0, pi ∈ ‖X1‖, θ ∥−X1,X0→ X1 and θ? t .u .pi ∈⊥ c .
Thus t 6∥−X1 and t ?pi ∈⊥ c . QED
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Another example : ∃x(Px→∀y P y)
Write this theorem ∀x[(Px→∀y P y)→⊥]→⊥. We must show :
z:∀x[(Px→∀y P y)→⊥]` ?:⊥. We get z:(Px→∀y P y)→⊥,
z:(Px→∀y P y)→ Px , ccz:Px , ccz:∀x Px , λd ccz:Px→∀y P y
and zλd ccz:⊥. Finally we have obtained the program θ =λz zλd ccz .
Let us find a characteristic feature in the behaviour of all terms θ
such that ` θ:∃x(Px→∀y P y). Let α0,α1, . . . and $0,$1, . . .
be a fixed sequence of terms and of stacks. We define a new instruction κ ;
its reduction rule uses two players named ∃ and ∀ and is as follows :
κ?ξ .piÂ ξ?αi .$ j
where i is first chosen by ∃, then j by ∀.
The player ∃ wins iff the execution arrives at αi ?$i for some i ∈N.
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∃x(Px→∀y P y) (cont.)
Theorem. If ` θ:∀x[(Px→∀y P y)→⊥]→⊥, there is a winning strategy for ∃ when
we execute the process θ?κ .pi (for any stack pi).
Proof. Let ⊥ be the set of processes for which there is a winning strategy for ∃.
Define a realizability model on N, by setting ‖Pn‖ = {$n}. Thus αn ∥−Pn.
Suppose that ξ ∥−Pi →∀y P y for some i ∈N. Then :
ξ?αi .$ j ∈⊥ for every j and it follows that κ?ξ .pi ∈⊥ , for any stack pi : indeed, a
strategy for ∃ is to play i and to continue with a strategy for ξ?αi .$ j if ∀ plays j .
It follows that κ ∥− (Pi →∀y P y)→⊥ and therefore :
κ ∥−∀x[(Px→∀y P y)→⊥]. Thus, θ?κ .pi ∈⊥ for every stack pi. QED
21
∃x(Px→∀y P y) (cont.)
Dual proof. If there is no winning strategy for ∃, then there is one for ∀ :
to play so that ∃ never has a winning strategy.
Suppose that ∀ has chosen such a strategy and define ⊥ c
to be the set of processes we can reach from θ?κ .pi.
Set, as before, ‖Pn‖ = {$n}. Then αn ∥−Pn because αn?$n is not reached.
Then κ 6∥−∀x[(Px→∀y P y)→⊥] because θ?κ .pi ∉⊥ .
Thus, there is an i ∈N and a ξ ∥−Pi →∀y P y s.t. κ?ξ .pi′ ∈⊥ c .
At this moment, ∃ can play αi and ∀ will play $ j by his strategy.
Thus ξ?αi .$ j ∈⊥ c because this process is reached.
This contradicts the property of ξ because αi ∥−Pi and $ j ∈ ‖∀y P y‖. QED
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∃x(Px→∀y P y) (cont.)
For instance, if θ =λz zλd ccz , we have :
θ?κ .piÂ κ?λd ccκ .piÂλd ccκ?αi0 .$ j0 if ∃ plays i0 and ∀ plays j0.
We get cc?κ .$ j0 Â κ?k$ j0 .$ j0. A winning strategy for ∃ is now to play j0 :
if ∀ plays j1, this gives k$ j0?α j0 .$ j1 Âα j0?$ j0.
Remark. The program θ does not gives explicitly a winning strategy.
Programs associated with proofs of arithmetical theorems will give such strategies,
i.e. will play in place of ∃.
We shall return to this topic later and consider the general case :
true first order formulas.
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Axioms for mathematics
Let us now consider the usual axiomatic theories which formalize mathematics.
• Analysis is written in second order logic. There are three groups of axioms :
1. Equations such as x+0= x , x+ sy = s(x+ y), . . .
and inequations such as s0 6= 0.
2. The recurrence axiom ∀x int(x), which says that each individual (1st order object)
is an integer. The formula int(x) is : ∀X {∀y(X y→ X sy),X0→ X x}.
3. The axiom of dependent choice :
If ∀X∃Y F (X ,Y ), then there exists a sequence Xn such that F (Xn,Xn+1).
Analysis is sufficient to formalize a very important part of mathematics
including the theory of functions of real or complex variables,
measure and probability theory, partial differential equations,
analytic number theory, Fourier analysis, etc.
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Axioms for mathematics (cont.)
• Axioms of ZFC can be classified in three groups :
1. Equality, extensionality, foundation.
2. Union, power set, substitution, infinity.
3. Choice : Any product of non void sets is non void ;
possibly other axioms such as CH, GCH, large cardinals.
In order to realize axioms 1 and 2 (i.e. ZF), we must interpret ZF
in another theory called ZFε which is much simpler to realize.
The λc-terms for ZF are rather complicated, but do not use new instructions.
The solution for AC and CH has been found very recently.
We need new instructions and get very complicated programs for these axioms.
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Realizability models of analysis
For the moment, we consider realizability models of 2nd order logic.
For these models, the domain of individuals is N
and the domain of k-ary predicate variables is P (Π)N
n
.
The only left free choice is ⊥ .
But it is important to remember that these domains are used only
for computing the truth values of formulas : ‖∀xΦ(x)‖ =⋃n∈N‖Φ(n)‖.
For example, it does not mean that the formula : “ every individual is an integer ”
that is the recurrence axiom ∀x∀X [∀y(X y→ X sy),X0→ X x] is realized.
Indeed, for the most usual choices of ⊥ , the negation of this formula is realized.
In order to grasp this strange situation, we absolutely need ordinary 2-valued models.
We now explain how to get them.
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Coherence
In fact, the situation is even worse, because there are
some useful examples of ⊥ for which ⊥ is realized. For instance :
⊥ = the set of processes the execution of which is infinite ; we have δδ ∥−⊥.
Now, by adequation lemma, the set of realized formulas is closed by
classical deduction. If this set is consistent, we say that ⊥ is coherent.
It means that there is no proof-like term θ such that θ ∥−⊥.
In other words, for every proof-like term θ, there is a stack pi such that θ?pi ∉⊥ .
From now on, we consider only the case when ⊥ is coherent.
Examples : let p0 be some given process ; then ⊥ = {p; p Â p0} is coherent if
there is at least 2 stack constants ; ⊥ = {p; p0 6Â p} is not coherent in general.
27
2-valued realizability models
Let ⊥ be a coherent saturated set of processes. Then the set of realized closed
formulas is closed under derivation in classical logic and does not contain ⊥.
It is therefore consistent and we obtain, in this way, 2-valued models
of second order logic or of set theory.
We shall see that these models are very different from the model we started with.
As told before, there exist individuals which are not integers ; but there are also
non-standard integers in the following strong sense : there is a unary predicate P
such that the formulas ∃x[int(x)∧Px], ¬Pn are realized for each integer n.
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The Boolean algebra P (Π)
Every coherent ⊥ gives a Boolean structure on the set P (Π) of truth values :
for X ,Y ⊂Π, define :
X ≤Y ⇔ there is a proof-like term θ s.t. θ ∥−X →Y
It is easy to prove that this is a Boolean preorder on P (Π), with X c = ‖¬X ‖ and
inf(X ,Y )= ‖X ∧Y ‖ = ‖∀X ((X ,Y → X )→ X )‖ or ‖(X ,Y →⊥)→⊥‖,
sup(X ,Y )= ‖X ∨Y ‖ = ‖∀X ((X → X ), (Y → X )→ X )‖
or ‖(X →⊥), (Y →⊥)→⊥‖.
Let B =P (Π)/' be this Boolean algebra.
Every closed formula has a value in P (Π) and therefore a value in B.
We get, in this way, Boolean models of second order logic or set theory.
Using any ultrafilter on B, we obtain again the 2-valued realizability models
described in the last slide.
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Remarks on 2-valued models
We use the following terminology : the standard model of analysis is (N,2N).
Given ⊥ , we have the realizability model associated with ⊥ , which is (N,P (Π)N)
with the definition of truth value of closed 2nd order formulas.
Then, we have the 2-valued realizability models, we have just defined.
For any closed second order formula F the following conditions are equivalent :
•M |= F for every 2-valued modelM associated with ⊥
• there exists a proof-like term θ s.t. θ ∥−F
Notice that every predicate and every function on individuals which is defined
in the standard model is also defined in the 2-valued realizability models
(because we put them in the language). But, in these models,
there are many individuals and predicates which are not named in the language.
For example, non-standard integers or non integers.
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Axioms of analysis : equations
Axioms : ¬(0= s0) ; p0= 0 ; ∀x(psx = x) ; ∀x(x+0= x) ; ∀x(x.0= 0) ;
∀x∀y(x+ sy = s(x+ y)) ; ∀x∀y(x.sy = xy +x)
Such equations and inequations are very easy to realize.
Theorem. Any true equation is realized by λx x .
Any true inequation is realized by λx xt for an arbitrary t.
Proof. x = y is defined by ∀X (X x→ X y) in second order logic. QED
Useful definition. Define a new predicate x 6= y by setting :
‖n 6= p‖ =;= ‖>‖ if n 6= p and ‖n 6= p‖ =Π= ‖⊥‖ if n = p .
Theorem. λxλy yx ∥−∀x∀y[x 6= y→¬(x = y)] and
λx xt ∥−∀x∀y[¬(x = y)→ x 6= y] for any t.
This means we can use the predicate x 6= y in place of ¬(x = y).
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Another important Boolean algebra
The predicate x2= x defines a set B of individuals, which is a Boolean algebra.
For example, ∀x∀y[x2= x, y2= y→ (x+ y −xy)2= x+ y −xy] is a consequence
of true equations (associativity, commutativity and distributivity).
Another way : realize ∀x∀y[x2= x, (x+ y −xy)2 6= x+ y −xy→ y2 6= y], i.e.
∀x(x2= x,1 6= 1→⊥)∩∀x(x2= x,x2 6= x→⊥) i.e.
∀x(1 6= 1→ x2 6= x)∩∀x(x2 6= x→ x2 6= x) realized by λx x .
Lemma. Every element 6= 1 of B is not a successor.
Indeed, (x+1)2= x+1 gives x2+x = 0 thus x = 0. QED
In most interesting models, the algebra B is not trivial, i.e. B 6= {0,1}.
This shows that there are individuals which are not integers.
Let us give an example.
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A non trivial Boolean algebra B
Set ⊥ = {p ∈Λ?Π; pÂ I ?pi0} ; I is λx x , pi0 is a fixed stack constant.
Lemma. |>,⊥→⊥|∩|⊥,>→⊥|= |>,>→⊥|.
It is clearly sufficient to prove ⊂. Let t ∈ |>,⊥→⊥|∩|⊥,>→⊥|, pi ∈Π,
κ= kpi0I ∥−⊥, ω= (λx xx)λx xx and a,b be two fresh constants.
Suppose that t ?a .b .piÂ a?pi′ ; then t ?ω .κ .piÂω?pi′′,
which contradicts t ∥−>,⊥ → ⊥. Therefore, during the execution of t ? a .b .pi,
neither a nor b comes in head position. Since t ?u .κ.pi Â I ?pi0, it follows that
t ?u .v .piÂ I ?pi0. This shows that t ∥−>,>→⊥. QED
Now, |∀x(x 6= 1,x 6= 0→ x2 6= x)| = |>,⊥→⊥|∩|⊥,>→⊥| ;
this shows that λx x00 ∥−¬∀x(x 6= 1,x 6= 0→ x2 6= x).
This formula means that B is a non trivial Boolean algebra.
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An atomless Boolean algebra B
An atom of B is a minimal element of B \ {0}. We show that, in the above model,
the algebra B has no atom ; thus, it is not only non trivial, but even infinite.
The fact that B is atomless is expressed by the formula :
∀x(x2= x,x 6= 0→∃y(y2= y ∧xy 6= 0∧xy 6= x) i.e.
∀x[∀y(xy 6= 0,xy 6= x→ y2 6= y),x 6= 0→ x2 6= x].
The truth value of this formula is :
|∀y(y 6= 0, y 6= 1→ y2 6= y),>→⊥|∩|∀y(0 6= 0,0 6= 0→⊥),⊥→⊥|.
We have just seen that |∀y(y 6= 0, y 6= 1→ y2 6= y)| = |>,>→⊥|.
Thus, we get |(>,>→⊥),>→⊥|∩|(⊥,⊥→⊥),⊥→⊥|
which is realized by λxλy xy y .
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Exercise on this model
We have shown that any element of B \ {1} has no predecessor (in every model).
But, in this model, the converse is false, i.e.
there are individuals without predecessor that are not in B.
We show that the formula ∃x[x2 6= x∧∀y(x 6= sy)] that is
∀x[x2 6= x,∀y(x 6= sy)→⊥]→⊥ is realized. We have
|∀y(n 6= sy)| => if n = 0 and ⊥ if n 6= 0. Therefore
|∀x[x2 6= x,∀y(x 6= sy)→⊥]| =⋂n |n2 6= n,∀y(n 6= sy)→⊥|
= |⊥,>→⊥|∩|⊥,⊥→⊥|∩|>,⊥→⊥|= |>,>→⊥| by the lemma above.
Thus |∃x[x2 6= x∧∀y(x 6= sy)]| = |(>,>→⊥)→⊥|
and this formula is realized by λx x00.
We have now many examples of non integers.
We have not yet given an example of a non-standard integer.
A much more difficult problem is : does there exist an ultrafilter on B ?
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Intersection of types
Let F (x) be any second order formula. It is interesting to compare the truth values
|F (1)∧ F (0)| and |F (1)| ∩ |F (0)|. We show that |F (1)| ∩ |F (0)| is equivalent to the
formula ∀x[x2= x→ F (x)]. This means that :
i) ∀x[x2= x→ F (x)]→|F (1)|∩ |F (0)| and
ii) |F (1)|∩ |F (0)|→∀x[x2= x→ F (x)] are both realized.
(i) is realized by λx xI (put x = 1,0 in x2= x→ F (x)).
Now ∀x[x2= x→ F (x)] is equivalent to ∀x[¬F (x)→ x2 6= x]
the value of which is |¬¬F (1)|∩ |¬¬F (0)|. But we have
λx xI ∥−|F (1)|∩ |F (0)|→ |¬¬F (1)|∩ |¬¬F (0)|.
We have found the meaning of F (1)∩F (0)
which is clearly stronger than F (1)∧F (0).
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Axioms of analysis : recurrence
The proper recurrence axiom is ∀x int(x), where int(x) is the formula :
∀X [X0,∀x(X x→ X sx)→ X x]
This axiom cannot be realized, even by means of new instructions ;
thus, in realizability models, there are individuals which are not integers.
There are two solutions, which are logically equivalent for integers ;
but they correspond to very different programming styles.
The first method is to discard the recurrence axiom
and restrict first order quantifiers to the formula int(x).
The second method is the same we shall use to realize axioms of ZF.
We define a new equality ' on individuals, which allows to realize
the recurrence axiom : every individual becomes equivalent to an integer.
It uses a fixpoint combinator and the programming style is LISP’s.
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Recurrence axiom, 1st method
The language has a function symbol for each recursive function.
Let int(x)≡∀X [∀y(X y→ X sy),X0→ X x].
Theorem. If a second order formula Φ is provable with the recurrence axiom,
then the restricted formula Φint is provable without it, using the axioms
∀x1 . . .∀xk{int(x1), . . . ,int(xk)→ int( f (x1, . . . ,xk))} for each symbol f .
Now, we only need to realize these new axioms. There are two ways of doing this :
• Prove this formula from true equations.
Examples. The successor s : int(x)→ int(sx) is provable with no equation.
Addition : int(x), int(y)→ int(x+ y) is provable with the equations :
x+0= x ; x+ sy = s(x+ y), . . .
This works for a very large class of recursive functions :
the provably total functions in second order arithmetic.
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Recurrence axiom (cont.)
• The second method works for every recursive function f .
Assume, for simplicity, that f is unary. We have two lemmas.
Lemma. If τ is a closed λ-term, τ'β n (Church integer), then τ ∥− int(sn0).
Define T =λ f λn(n)λg g◦ s . f .0 (storage operator [5]).
Storage lemma. If (∀pi ∈ ‖X ‖)φ? sn0 .pi ∈⊥ then Tφ ∥− int(n)→ X .
Proof. Let ‖P j‖ = {sn− j0 .pi; pi ∈ ‖X ‖} for 0≤ j ≤ n ;
‖P j‖ =; for j > n. Then λg g◦ s ∥−∀x(Px→ Psx) and φ ∥−P0.
Thus, if ν ∥− int(n) then ν?λg g◦ s .φ .pi ∈⊥ which gives Tφ?ν .pi ∈⊥ . QED
We can state this result as follows : T ∥−∀X∀n{({sn0}→ X )→ (int(n)→ X )} i.e. the
formula int(n) may be replaced with {sn0} when computing truth values.
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Recurrence axiom (cont.)
Finally, we realize the axiom we need :
Theorem. Let τ be a closed λ-term which computes the recursive function f .
Then Tλx τx ∥−∀x[int(x)→ int( f (x))].
By the storage lemma, we only need to prove that λx τx? sn0 .pi ∈⊥
for pi ∈ ‖int( f (n))‖. But this follows from the first lemma,
since τsn0'β r with r = f (n). QED
40
Imperative call-by-value
Let ν ∈Λc such that ` ν:int(sn0) ; i.e. ν "behaves like" the integer n.
In the λc-term φν this data is called by name by the program φ.
In the λc-term Tφν the same data is called by value by φ,
which means it is computed first (in the form sn0).
Theorem. If ` ν:int(sn0), then Tφ?ν .piÂφ? sn0 .pi.
Let ⊥ = {p; pÂφ? sn0 .pi}. Then Tφ?ν .pi ∈⊥ , by the storage lemma. QED
I name this behaviour imperative call-by-value, to avoid confusion with
the well-known notion of (functional) call-by-value, and because
it is very similar to the usual notion of call-by-value in imperative languages.
It is only defined for data types (booleans, integers, trees, . . . )
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Computing recursive functions
So, we can discard the recurrence axiom and replace it with the formulas :
∀x1 . . .∀xk{int(x1), . . . ,int(xk)→ int( f (x1, . . . ,xk))} for each symbol f .
These formulas make sense, because there exist individuals which are not integers.
Theorem. If `φ :∀~x{~int(~x)→ int( f~x)}, then φ computes the function f , i.e. :
if ~n is a sequence of Church integers, then Tκ?φ~n .piÂ κ? sp0 .pi with p = f (~n).
This works for every data type : Booleans, integers, sums, products and lists
of data types, etc. Here, we only use the types of integers and of Booleans.
Bool(x)≡∀X (X1,X0→ X x). For this type we have :
Theorem. If `φ :∀x{int(x)→ Bool( f (x))}, then
φ? nˆ . t .u .piÂ t ?pi if f (n)= 1 ; φ? nˆ . t .u .piÂ u?pi if f (n)= 0
where nˆ is any closed λ-term β-equivalent to the Church integer n.
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Remarks on head linear reduction
If we use the head linear reduction machine, the storage lemma is no longer true :
the storage operator T =λ f λn(n)λg g◦ s . f .0 introduces garbage.
We define a storage instruction T and an auxiliary instruction U
with the following execution rules :
T?φ .ν .piÂ ν?U .φ .0 .pi and U? g .ξ .piÂ g ? sξ .pi.
Storage lemma. If (∀pi ∈ ‖X ‖)φ? sn0 .pi ∈⊥ then Tφ ∥− int(n)→ X .
Proof. Let ‖P j‖ = {sn− j0 .pi; pi ∈ ‖X ‖} for 0≤ j ≤ n ;
‖P j‖ =; for j > n. Then U ∥−∀x(Px→ Psx) and φ ∥−P0.
Thus, if ν ∥− int(n) then ν?U .φ .pi ∈⊥ which gives Tφ?ν .pi ∈⊥ . QED
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Recurrence axiom, 2nd method
Theorem. Y ∥−∀x[∀y(X y→ sy 6= x)→¬X x]→∀x¬X x
where Y= AA with A =λaλ f ( f )(a)a f is the Turing fixpoint combinator.
Its execution rule is Y? t .piÂ t ?Yt .pi.
Remark. In head linear reduction, Y must be an instruction with this reduction rule.
Now, this formula says that the relation sy = x is well founded.
From this, it is easy to prove that every individual x can be uniquely written as
x = x0+n, where n is an integer and x0 has no predecessor.
We have defined an equivalence relation on individuals and we consider integers as
equivalence classes. The class 0 is the set of individuals without predecessor.
The recurrence axiom ∀X∀x[∀y(X y → X sy),X0→ X x] which we cannot realize, is
replaced with : ∀X∀x[∀y(X y→ X sy),∀y(y ' 0→ X y)→ X x]
which is provable from the well foundedness of sy = x .
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Fixpoint and well foundedness
We prove more generally :
Theorem. Let x@ y be well founded on integers and φ(x, y) its characteristic
function. Then Y ∥−∀X {∀x[∀y(X y→φ(y,x) 6= 1)→¬X x]→∀x¬X x}.
Proof. Let t ∥−∀x[∀y(X (y)→φ(y,x) 6= 1)→¬X (x)]
for some X :N→P (Π). We prove Yt ∥−¬X (n) by induction on n,
following @. Let u ∥−X (n), we must prove Y? tupi ∈⊥ , i.e. t ?Yt .u.pi ∈⊥ .
It is sufficient to prove Yt ∥−∀y(X (y)→φ(y,n) 6= 1).
Now, if y @ n, this is true because Yt ∥−X (y)→⊥, by induction hypothesis ;
else this is also true because ‖φ(y,n) 6= 1‖ =;. Q.E.D.
45
Non standard integers (1st example)
Let an,pin be given sequences of λ-constants (instructions) and stack constants.
Define a realizability model by setting ⊥ = {p ∈Λ?Π; ∃n(pÂ an?pin)}.
In this model, define a unary predicate P by ‖Pn‖ = {pin}.
Since an ∥−Pn, every 2-valued realizability model satisfies Pn for every n ∈N.
We show that there are such models with non-standard integers :
more precisely, the formula ∀x[int(x)→ Px] is not realized.
Indeed, consider a proof-like term θ ∥−∀x[int(x)→ Px]
and choose n such that an is not in θ.
Then θ?n .pin ∈⊥ , i.e. θ?n .pin Â an?pin which is impossible.
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Non standard integers (cont.)
Suppose now we have an instruction σ with the following execution rule :
σ? t .piÂ t ?n .pin where pin is the stack constant of pi.
Then σ ∥−∀x[int(x)→ Px]→⊥
i.e. there are non-standard integers in every 2-valued realizability model.
Indeed, let t ∥−∀x[int(x)→ Px] and pi ∈Π.
We must show that σ? t .pi ∈⊥ , i.e. t ?n .pin ∈⊥ .
This follows from the hypothesis on t .
Instructions similar with σ will be used in order to realize
the axiom of dependent choice.
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Examples of arithmetical theorems
Theorem. Let ` θ : ∃x[int(x)∧ f (x)= 0], with f recursive. Let κ be a stop instruction.
Then θ?Tκ .piÂ κ? sn0 .pi with f (n)= 0 ; T is the storage operator.
Proof. We have θ ∥−∀x[int(x)→ f (x) 6= 0]→⊥.
Now take ⊥ = {p ; p Â κ? sn0 .pi with f (n)= 0}.
We simply have to show that Tκ ∥−∀x[int(x)→ f (x) 6= 0] i.e. by the storage lemma,
that κ? sn0 .pi ∈⊥ for every n such that pi ∈ ‖ f (n) 6= 0‖.
But this means that ‖ f (n) 6= 0‖ 6= ; and thus f (n)= 0. QED
Remark. κ is clearly a pointer to an integer. In the program, we wrote Tκ,
because we want it to point to a computed integer.
It is the intuitive meaning of imperative call-by-value.
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Examples of arithmetical theorems (cont.)
We consider now an arithmetical theorem {∃x∀y[ f (x, y) 6= 0]}int.
Define a game with two players ∃ and ∀ : ∃ plays an integer m, ∀ answers by n ;
the play stops as soon as f (m,n) 6= 0 and then ∃ won ;
thus ∀ wins if and only if the play does not stop.
Intuitively, ∃ is the “ defender ” of the theorem and
∀ “ attacks ” it, searching to exhibit a counter-example.
It is clear that ∃ has a winning strategy if and only if N |= ∃x∀y[ f (x, y) 6= 0] ; then,
there is an obvious strategy for ∃ : simply play successively 0,1,2, . . .
We show that a proof of {∃x∀y[ f (x, y) 6= 0]}int gives an explicit programming
of a winning strategy for the “ defender ”.
Usually, this strategy is much more efficient than the trivial one.
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Programming a winning strategy
Let us add to our symbolic machine, an instruction κ which allows an interactive
execution. Its execution rule is :
κ? sn0 .ξ .piÂ ξ? sp0 .pinp
for n,p ∈N ; pinp is a stack constant.
This execution rule is non deterministic since p is arbitrary. Intuitive meaning :
in the left hand side, the program (the player ∃), plays the integer n and prepares
a handler ξ for the answer of ∀ ; in the right hand side, the attacker ∀ plays p ;
pinp store the information about this move.
Theorem. If ` θ : {∃x∀y( f (x, y) 6= 0)}int, then every reduction of θ?Tκ .pi
gives ξ? sp0 .pinp with f (n,p) 6= 0 (T is the storage operator).
This means that the process θ?Tκ .pi acts as a winning strategy for ∃.
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Programming a winning strategy (cont.)
Proof. Take for ⊥ the set of processes every reduction of which gives
ξ? sp0 .pinp with f (n,p) 6= 0. We must show that θ?Tκ .pi ∈⊥ .
Now θ ∥−∀x[int(x),∀y(int(y)→ f (x, y) 6= 0)→⊥]→⊥.
Therefore, by definition of ∥− , it is sufficient to show that :
Tκ ∥−∀x[int(x),∀y(int(y)→ f (x, y) 6= 0)→⊥].
By the storage lemma, we only need to show that :
if ξ ∥−∀y(int(y)→ f (n, y) 6= 0) then κ? sn0 .ξ .pi ∈⊥ , i.e.
ξ? sp0 .pinp ∈⊥ for every p ∈N.
If f (n,p) 6= 0, this is true by definition of ⊥ .
Else, pinp ∈ ‖ f (n,p) 6= 0‖ =Π, hence the result, by hypothesis on ξ. QED
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Programming a winning strategy (cont.)
Remark. κ can be considered as a pointer to the object (n,ξ) consisting of the
integer n and the handler ξ (data and method). Moreover, the integer n is called by
value which is guaranteed by writing Tκ instead of κ.
Example. We take the theorem {∃x∀y[ f (x)≤ f (y)]}int where f is recursive.
Let φ(x, y) be the characteristic function of the well founded relation f (x)< f (y).
The formula is ∀x[int(x),∀y(int(y)→φ(y,x) 6= 1)→⊥]→⊥.
A particular case of the result p. 44 is :
Y ∥−∀x[∀y(int(y)→φ(y,x) 6= 1)→¬int(x)]→∀x¬int(x).
Thus, we get θ =λh(Yλxλnhnx)0. It is easily checked that the process
θ?Tκ .pi gives the following strategy, much better than the trivial one :
∃ plays 0 ; if ∀ plays p and if f (p)< f (0), then ∃ plays p and so on.
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The axiom of dependent choice
We need a new instruction in our machine. Any of the following two will work :
1. The signature. Let t 7→ nt be a function from closed terms into the integers,
which is very easily computable and “practically” one-to-one. It means that the one-
to-one property has to be true only for the terms which appear during the execution
of a given process. And also that we never try to compute the inverse function.
We define an instruction σ with the following reduction rule :
σ? t .piÂ t ?nt .pi.
A simple way to implement such an instruction is to take for nt the signature
of the term t , given by a standard algorithm, such as MD5 or SHA1.
Indeed, these functions are almost surely one-to-one for the terms
which appear during a finite execution of a given process.
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The axiom of dependent choice (cont.)
2. The clock. It is denoted as ħ and its reduction rule is :
ħ? t .piÂ t ?n .pi
where n is a Church integer which is the current time (for instance, the number of
reduction steps from the boot).
Both instructions, the clock and the signature, can be given (realize) the same type,
which is not DC but a formula DC’ which implies DC in classical logic.
By means of this proof, we get a λ-term γ[cc,σ] or γ[cc,ħ] which has the type DC.
The instructions σ, ħ appear only inside this λ-term γ.
By looking at its behavior, we find that the integers produced by these instructions
are only compared with each other. No other operation is performed on these
integers.
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” Proof ” of the dependent choice axiom
For simplicity, we consider the countable choice axiom :
∃Z∀x(F [x,Z (x, y)/X y]→∀X F [x,X ])
Indeed, the dependent choice is the same formula in which the individual parameter
x is replaced with a predicate parameter. There is nothing to change in the following
proofs, because the parameter does not play any role.
We use a variant of the instruction σ with the following reduction rule :
σ? t .piÂ t ?npi .pi
(pi 7→ npi is a given recursive bijection of Π onto N).
Theorem. There exists a ” predicate ” U :N3→P (Π) such that
σ ∥−∀x{∀n(int[n]→ F [x,U (x,n, y)/X y])→∀X F [x,X ]}.
55
The dependent choice axiom (cont.)
The usual countable choice axiom follows easily, but not intuitionistically.
Simply define, for each x , the unary predicate Z (x,•) asU (x,n,•) for the first integer
n s.t. ¬F [x,U (x,n, y)/X y], or as N if there is no such integer :
Z (x,z)≡∀n{int(n),∀p(int(p),p < n→ F [x,U (x,p, y)/X y]),
¬F [x,U (x,n, y)/X y]→U (x,n,z)}.
Proof. By definition of ‖∀X F [x,X ]‖, we have :
pi ∈ ‖∀X F [x,X ]‖⇔ (∃R ∈P (Π)N)pi ∈ ‖F [x,R/X ]‖.
By countable choice, we get a function U :N3→P (Π) such that
pi ∈ ‖∀X F [x,X ]‖⇔pi ∈ ‖F [x,U (x,npi, y)/X y]‖.
Let x ∈N, t ∥−∀n(int[n]→ F [x,U (x,n, y)/X y]) and pi ∈ ‖∀X F [x,X ]‖.
We must show that σ? t .pi ∈⊥ and, by the rule for σ,
it suffices to show t ?npi .pi ∈⊥ . But this follows from
npi ∥− int(snpi0), pi ∈ ‖F [x,U (x,npi, y)/X y]‖ (by definition of U ) and
t ∥− int(snpi0)→ F [x,U (x,npi, y)/X y]. QED
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Instructions for dependent choice
This proof gives a rather complicated term γ containing ħ and cc which realizes
the dependent choice axiom. It is much clearer to give it as an instruction ;
in any case, this is necessary if we use head linear reduction.
We introduce four instructions γ,E,U0,U1. Their execution rules are :
γ? t .piÂ E? t .n .pi where n is the current time or the number of the stack pi.
E? t .m .piÂ t ? (((U0)(E)t )m)kpi . (((U1)(E)t )m)kpi .pi
U0? t .m .k .u .ρ Â u? t .m .k .ρ
U1? t .n .kpi .u . t ′ .n′ .kpi′ .ρ Â u?ρ if n = n′;
Â t ′?n .pi if n < n′
Â t ?n′ .pi′ if n′< n
pi,pi′,ρ are arbitrary stacks ; t , t ′,m,k,u are arbitrary terms ;
n,n′ are integers in the form introduced by γ.
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Instructions for dependent choice (cont.)
We now show that γ realizes the dependent choice, as follows : given a formula
F [Y ] with some parameters we do not write, we explicitly define a unary predicate
V :N→P (Π) and prove that γ ∥−∀Y (∀y(V y↔ Y y)→ F [Y ])→∀Y F [Y ].
Remark. It will be clear, from the definition of V , that if the formula is F [X ,Y ] with
the parameter X , then V :P (Π)N×N→P (Π), i.e. V :P (Π)N→P (Π)N.
Thus, we have γ ∥−∀X {∀Y (∀y(V [X ](y)↔ Y y)→ F [X ,Y ])→∀Y F [X ,Y ]}
which is stronger than dependent choice (non extensional axiom of choice).
We first define a binary predicate U :N2→P (Π), such that for every stack pi :
pi ∈ ‖∀X F [X ]‖ ⇒ pi ∈ ‖F [Un]‖ where pi=pin (n is the number of pi).
Un is the unary predicate defined by Un(y)=U (n, y).
Since ‖∀X F [X ]‖ =⋃{F [V ]; V :N→P (Π)}, this a simple application
of the countable choice axiom.
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Instructions for dependent choice (cont.)
Define now a unary predicate V :N→P (Π) in the following way :
V (y)≡∀n{⋂m<n|{m}→ F [Um]|, {n},Φn→Uny}
with Φn = {kpi; pi ∈ ‖F [Un]‖}.
Intuitively, V is Un for the first integer n such that ¬F [Un] if there is one,
and N otherwise. Indeed, {m} stands for int(m) and Φn for ¬F [Un].
Lemma. E ∥−∀n(∀y(V y↔Uny)→ F [Un])→⋂n |{n}→ F [Un]|.
Remarks. i) This lemma will be used with the stronger hypothesis :
∀Y (∀y(V y↔ Y y)→ F [Y ]).
ii) ∀y(V y↔ Y y)→ F [Y ] is an abbreviation for
∀y(V y→ Y y),∀y(Y y→V y)→ F [Y ].
We prove, by induction on n, that
if t ∥−∀n{∀y(V y↔Uny)→ F [Un]} and pi ∈ ‖F [Un]‖.
then E? t .n .pi ∈⊥ . Using the rule for E, it suffices to show that :
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i) (((U0)(E)t )n)kpi ∥−∀y(V y→Uny)
ii) (((U1)(E)t )n)kpi ∥−∀y(Uny→V y).
Proof of (i). Let v ∥−V y and ρ ∈ ‖Uny‖ ; we must show that
U0?E t .n .kpi .v .ρ ∈⊥ , i.e. v ?E t .n .kpi .ρ ∈⊥ .
By the induction hypothesis, we have E t ∈⋂m<n |{m}→ F [Um]|.
By hypothesis on pi, we have kpi ∈Φn . Hence the result, by definition of V (y).
Proof of (ii). Let u ∥−Uny , η′ ∈⋂m<n′ |{m}→ F [Um]|, n′ ∈N, pi′ ∈ ‖F [Un′]‖
and ρ ∈ ‖Un′y‖. We have to show that U1?E t .n .kpi .u .η′ .n′ .kpi′ .ρ ∈⊥ .
If n = n′, this is u?ρ ∈⊥ , which is true by the hypothesis on u and ρ.
If n < n′, this is η′?n .pi ∈⊥ , which is true by the hypothesis on η′ and pi.
If n′< n, this is E t ?n′ .pi′ ∈⊥ . But, by the induction hypothesis, we have :
E t ∥− {n′}→ F [Un′], hence the result since, by hypothesis, pi′ ∈ ‖F [Un′]‖. QED
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Theorem. γ ∥−∀Y {∀y(V y↔ Y y)→ F [Y ]}→∀Y F [Y ].
Let t ∥−∀Y {∀y(V y↔ Y y)→ F [Y ]} and pi ∈ ‖∀Y F [Y ]‖.
Thus, we have pi ∈ ‖F [Un]‖ where n is the number of pi (pi=pin).
By the lemma above, it follows that E? t .n .pi ∈⊥ , which gives the result,
using the execution rule of γ. QED
As explained before, if F ≡ F [X ,Y ] has a second order unary predicate parameter X
then V :P (Π)N→P (Π)N is defined by
V [X , y]≡∀n{⋂m<n|{m}→ F [X ,Um[X ]]|, {n},Φn→Un[X , y]}.
We have γ ∥−∀X {∀Y (∀y(V [X ](y)↔ Y y)→ F [X ,Y ])→∀Y F [X ,Y ]}
and V [X ] is a choice function which is non-extensional :
the formula ∀x(X x↔ X ′x)→∀y(V [X , y]↔V [X ′, y]) is not realized.
Nevertheless, we get the dependent choice, because we can iterate the function V ,
which gives the desired sequence V n[X0] of predicates.
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Example
We prove the following formula intuitionistically from the axiom of choice :
∀a[(Ra→∀x Rx)→⊥]→⊥, which we denote ∃∗a[Ra→∀x Rx].
Take F [X ]≡ X 6= ;→ X ∩R 6= ; i.e. F [X ]≡∃x X x→∃x{X x,Rx}.
By the axiom of choice : γ ∥−∀X {∀x(V x↔ X x)→ F [X ]}→∀X F [X ].
As every formula, F [X ] is compatible with extensionality.
Thus F [V ]`∀X {∀x(V x↔ X x)→ F [X ]}.
We easily show ∀X F [X ]`∀x Rx : take X x ≡ (x = y).
Now, we have to show `∃∗a(Ra→ F [V ]), i.e. ∃∗a(∃xV x,Ra→∃x{V x,Rx}). By the
intuitionistic rule : A→∃∗aB(a)`∃∗a[A→B(a)], we have now to show :
∃xV x→∃∗a(Ra→∃x{V x,Rx}). It is sufficient to prove :
∃xV x→∃∗a(Ra→Va∧Ra) i.e. ∃xV x→∃∗a(Ra→Va)) or finally
∃xV x→∃∗aVa which is trivial.
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Thus, we obtain `∃∗a[Ra→∀x Rx] by an intuitionistic proof
from the non-extensional axiom of choice. The program we get contains γ
but no occurrence of cc. Here it is :
B =λk(k)λr
(γλxλyλαλu((u)(x)(α)λx(k)λr (γλx′λy ′λαλu((u)(x′)(y)x)r )J I )r )J I
with I =λx x , J =λx xI .
We have checked that this term implements correctly a winning strategy for ∃
in the game associated with the formula ∀a[(Ra→∀x Rx)→⊥]→⊥.
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The standard realizability model of Analysis
Realizability models are obtained by choosing a set ⊥ which must be saturated
and coherent. Let ⊥ c be the complement of ⊥ . The conditions on ⊥ c are :
p∈⊥ c , p Âq ⇒ q∈⊥ c (saturation) ;
for every proof-like term ξ there is a stack pi s.t. ξ?pi ∈⊥ c (coherence).
Let ξ 7→piξ be a one-one map from proof-like terms into stack constants.
If ξ?piξ ∈ ⊥ c for every ξ, the set ⊥ is obviously coherent. The set of all processes
obtained by executing ξ?piξ will be called the thread generated by the proof-like
term ξ, and ξ?piξ is the boot of this thread.
Thus, ⊥ c = the union of all threads is a somewhat canonical way to define ⊥ .
We have thus ⊥ c = {p; there is a proof-like ξ s.t. ξ?piξÂ p}
We call this model the standard realizability model.
Nevertheless, as we shall see, it contains non standard integers.
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B in the standard realizability model
We show that the Boolean algebra B of individuals x s.t. x2= x is non trivial.
Theorem. Let d0= δδ0 and d1= δδ1, with δ=λx xx . Then :
λx(cc)λk((x)(k)d0)(k)d1 ∥−∀x(x 6= 1,x 6= 0→ x2 6= x)→⊥.
We know that |∀x(x 6= 1,x 6= 0→ x2 6= x)| = |>,⊥→⊥|∩|⊥,>→⊥|.
Let t ∈ |>,⊥→⊥|∩|⊥,>→⊥| and pi ∈Π. We must show that :
λx(cc)λk((x)(k)d0)(k)d1? t .pi ∈ ⊥ that is t ? kpid0 .kpid1 .pi ∈ ⊥ . If this is not true,
by hypothesis on t , we have kpid0,kpid1 6∥−⊥. Therefore, both terms appear in head
position in some thread ; since they both contain the stack constant of pi, these
threads are the same one ; thus d0 and d1 appear in head position in the same
thread, which is absurd. QED
We now show that this Boolean algebra is atomless.
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Theorem. Let θ =λxλy ccλk((x)(k)y0)((x)(k)y1)(k)y2. Then we have :
θ ∥−∀x[∀y(xy 6= 0,xy 6= x→ y2 6= y),x 6= 0→ x2 6= x]
(which means that the Boolean algebra B has no atom).
A simple computation shows that we have to prove i) and ii) :
i) θ ∥− (⊥,⊥→⊥),⊥→⊥.
Let t ∈ |⊥,⊥→⊥| and u ∈ |⊥|.
We have to show that θ? t .u.pi ∈⊥ i.e. = t ?kpiu0.((t )(kpi)u1)(kpi)u2.pi ∈⊥ .
But u ∥−⊥ ⇒ kpiuξ ∥−⊥ for all ξ. Since t ∥−⊥,⊥→⊥, it follows that
((t )(kpi)u1)(kpi)u2 ∥−⊥ and therefore t ?kpiu0.((t )(kpi)u1)(kpi)u2.pi ∈⊥ .
ii) θ ∥−|>,⊥→⊥|∩|⊥,>→⊥|,>→⊥.
Let t ∈ |>,⊥→⊥|∩|⊥,>→⊥| and u ∈Λc .
Again, we have to show that t ?kpiu0.((t )(kpi)u1)(kpi)u2.pi ∈⊥ .
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Let t ∈ |>,⊥→⊥|∩|⊥,>→⊥| and u ∈Λc .
Again, we have to show that t ?kpiu0.((t )(kpi)u1)(kpi)u2.pi ∈⊥ .
If this is not true, the hypothesis on t gives successively :
kpiu0 6∥−⊥ and ((t )(kpi)u1)(kpi)u2 6∥−⊥ ; and then kpiu1 6∥−⊥ and kpiu2 6∥−⊥.
It follows that kpiu0,kpiu1,kpiu2 all appear in head position in some thread.
Since they contain kpi, these threads are the same (their stack constant is the same).
Suppose, for example, that kpiu0 appears first in head position,
then kpiu1, and then kpiu2. We have thus :
kpiu0?pi0Â u?piÂ ·· · Â kpiu1?pi1Â u?piÂ ·· · Â kpiu2?pi2Â u?piÂ ·· ·
But such an execution is clearly impossible because, at the second appearance
of the process u?pi, we enter in a loop and can never arrive at kpiu2?pi2. QED
Thus, the standard realizability model contains non integers.
We now show it contains also non-standard integers.
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A generic non-standard integer
Let n 7→ ξn be a fixed recursive enumeration of proof-like terms. We define a unary
predicate G by setting :
‖Gn‖ =Πn i.e. the set of stacks which end with the constant piξn .
We assume there is no instruction which changes the stack constant.
It follows that piξ is the only one which appears in the thread ξ?piξ.
Since
⋃
nΠn =Π, we get ‖∀xGx‖ =Π, thus I ∥−¬∀xGx .
We show that Gn is realized for each integer n. Indeed suppose that :
δδ0 6∥−Gn and δδ1 6∥−Gn with δ=λx xx .
Then, ξn?piξn Â δδ0?pi0 and ξn?piξn Â δδ1?pi1 which is impossible.
It follows that the predicate G contains every standard integer,
but not every individual. Does it contain every integer ?
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A generic non-standard integer (cont.)
Let ς (for ”self”) be a new instruction with the following reduction rule :
ς? t .piÂ t ?n .pi ; n is the integer such that pi ∈Πn .
Then ς ∥−∀x(int(x)→Gx)→⊥.
Indeed, if t ∥−∀x(int(x)→Gx) and pi ∈Πn , then n ∥− int(n) and pi ∈ ‖Gn‖.
Thus t ?n .pi ∈⊥ and ς? t .pi ∈⊥ .
It follows that the predicate ¬G contains at least one non-standard integer.
In the next slide, we show that the formula ∀x∀y{¬Gx,x 6= y→Gy} is realized.
Thus, the predicate ¬Gx consists in exactly one individual
and it is a non-standard integer. We call it the generic integer.
We add a new individual constant g to our language, and replace Gx with x 6= g.
The non-standard proof-like term ξg has remarkable properties.
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A generic non-standard integer (cont.)
The following lemma is a useful tool in order to show that A∨B is realized.
Lemma. If ξ?kpi .ρ ∈⊥ for all pi ∈ ‖A‖ and ρ ∈ ‖B‖,
then γξ ∥−¬A→B with γ=λxλy ccλh y cch◦x .
The hypothesis gives cckρ◦ξ ∥−A. If t ∥−¬A, we get t cckρ◦ξ ∥−⊥,
therefore ccλh t cch◦ξ?ρ ∈⊥ for every ρ ∈ ‖B‖.
Thus, γξ? t .ρ ∈⊥ , because it reduces to this process. QED
We want to show that ∀x∀y[¬Gx,x 6= y→Gy] is realized.
By the preceding lemma, it is sufficient to show that :
0?kpi . t .ρ ∈⊥ with 0=λxλy y , pi ∈ ‖Gn‖ =Πn , ρ ∈ ‖Gp‖ =Πp , t ∥−n 6= p .
If n 6= p , this process is in no thread, because it contains two different stack constants
piξn and piξp . If n = p , then t ∥−⊥ and 0?kpi . t .ρ Â t ?ρ, hence the result. QED
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The clock in the standard realizability model
The execution rule of the clock instruction ħ is defined formally as follows :
let piξ be the stack constant of the current process ħ? t .pi.
“ Reboot ” ξ?piξ until you arrive at ħ? t .pi (if this never happens, you are stuck).
Let n be the number of steps ; then ħ? t .piÂ t ?n .pi.
The implementation is much simpler : you only have to set a counter
which is incremented at each step.
Warning : you must check that the current process ħ? t .pi was not attained before.
In this case, you enter an endless loop.
Definition. A term θ is called strongly solvable if θ ∥−⊥→⊥.
This means that, if θ? t comes in head position in a thread, and t is not proof-like,
then t comes in head position in this thread.
θ is called solvable if λx θx . . .x is strongly solvable.
If θ is a usual λ-term, this is the usual notion of solvability.
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Theorem. If θ is a (strongly) solvable proof-like term,
then it comes in head position in the generic thread.
Let φθ :N
2→ {0,1} be the recursive function such that : φθ(n,p)= 1 iff
θ comes in head position in the thread ξp ?piξp at the (n+4)-th step.
We show that ħλxλy(θ)(y)x ∥−∀p{∀n[int(n)→φθ(n,p) 6= 1]→ p 6= g}
(in other words, ∃n{int(n),φθ(n,g)= 1}).
Let p ∈N, pi ∈ ‖p 6= g‖ and t ∥−∀n[int(n)→φθ(n,p) 6= 1].
Suppose that ħλxλy(θ)(y)x ? t .pi ∉ ⊥ . Therefore, this process appears in a thread,
which is ξp ?piξp because pi ∈ ‖p 6= g‖. Thus, we have :
ξp ?piξp Âħλxλy(θ)(y)x? t .piÂ θ? tn.pi, where n is the number of steps
in the reduction of ξp ?piξp until ħλxλy(θ)(y)x? t .pi. Thus, we obtain θ? tn.pi
at the (n+4)-th step of reduction. Since θ is in head position at this moment,
we have φθ(n,p)= 1. By hypothesis on t , it follows that tn ∥−⊥. Now, by hypothesis,
θ ∥−⊥→⊥ and therefore θ? tn.pi ∈⊥ . This is a contradiction, because
θ? tn.pi appears in the thread ξp ?piξp . QED
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Theorem. If θ is a proof-like term such that θm is strongly solvable for each m ∈N,
then the following formula is realized :
“ ∀m{int(m)→ θm comes in head position in the generic thread} ”.
Remark. It follows that the generic thread neither stops, nor loops (take θ = 0).
Let ψθ :N
3→ {0,1} be the recursive function defined by ψθ(m,n,p)= 1 iff
θm comes in head position at the (n+4)-th step in the thread ξp ?piξp . We prove :
Tλmħλxλy(θm)(y)x ∥−∀p∀m{int(m),∀n[int(n)→ψθ(m,n,p) 6= 1]→ p 6= g}
(in other words ∀m(int(m)→∃n{int(n),ψθ(m,n,g)= 1})).
It is sufficient to prove that, for all integers m,p
and all stacks ρ in ‖∀n[int(n)→ψθ(m,n,p) 6= 1]→ p 6= g‖, we have :
ħλxλy(θm)(y)x?ρ ∈⊥ . But this results from the last theorem
and the fact that ψθ(m,n,p)=φθm(n,p). QED
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Clock and choice
We check that, with the clock instruction ħ, the axiom of dependent choice is real-
ized.
Theorem. Let F [x,X ] be a formula with parameters, X being a unary predicate
variable. There exists Φ :N4→P (Π) such that :
ħ ∥−∀x∀p∀X {∀n(int(n),F [x,Φ(n,p,x, y)/X y]→⊥),F [x,X ]→ p 6= g}.
We define v :N2→Λc by putting : v(n,p)= the λc-term u which is in second posi-
tion in the stack, at the n-th execution step in the thread ξp ?piξp . At the n-th step
of this execution, we have therefore a process of the form τ? t .u.pi.
We define now Φ(n,p,x, y), (using axiom of choice), in such a way that :
If there exists X :N→P (Π) such that v(n,p) ∥−F [x,X ]
then v(n,p) ∥−F [x,Φ(n,p,x, y)/X y].
Then Φ has the desired property :
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Clock and choice (cont.)
Consider x,p ∈N, X :N→P (Π), λc-terms t ,u such that
t ∥−∀n(int(n),F [x,Φ(n,p,x, y)/X y]→⊥), u ∥−F [x,X ]
and a stack pi ∈ ‖p 6= g‖. We must show that ħ? t .u.pi ∈⊥ .
If not, then ħ? t .u.pi appears in a thread, at the n-th step.
By hypothesis on pi, this thread is ξp ?piξp .
Thus, we have u = v(n,p), by definition of v , hence v(n,p) ∥−F [x,X ].
By definition of Φ, we get u = v(n,p) ∥−F [x,Φ(n,p,x, y)/X y].
But, since n ∥− int(n), it follows that t ?n.u.pi ∈⊥ , by hypothesis on t .
This is a contradiction, because this process appears at the (n+1)-th step
in the thread ξp ?piξp . QED
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Clock and choice (cont.)
It follows that the standard generic model satisfies the formula :
∀x∀X (F [x,X ]→∃n{int(n),F [x,Φ(n,g,x, y)/X y]}).
Thus, we can define the binary predicate Ψ(x, y) by the formula :
“ Φ(n,g,x, y) for the first integer n such that F [x,Φ(n,g,x, y)/X y],
and > if there is no such integer ”.
Then, we have, in the generic model :
∀x∀X (F [x,X ]→ F [x,Ψ(x, y)/X y]) which is the axiom of choice.
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A game on first order formulas
We consider first order formulas written with :
→, ∀, >, ⊥, 6=, predicate constants, function symbols for recursive functions.
A 1st order formula has the form ∀~x[Φ1, . . . ,Φn→ A] where Φ1, . . . ,Φn
are 1st order formulas and A is atomic (i.e. Rt1 . . . tk or t0 6= t1 or > or ⊥).
In the following, we only consider closed 1st order formulas.
The atomic closed formula t0 6= t1 is interpreted as > (resp. ⊥)
if it is true (resp. false) in N.
We define a game between two players : ∃ (the defender) and ∀ (the opponent).
At each step, there are two sets U ,V of closed 1st order formulas
and a set A of closed atomic formulas. U and A increase at each step.
U (resp. V ) is the choice set for ∃ (resp. ∀).
At the beginning of the game
U =;, A = {⊥} and V = V0, a given (finite) set of closed formulas.
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A move of the game is as follows : the player ∀ chooses a formula Φ ∈ V ,
Φ≡∀~x[Ψ1(~x), . . . ,Ψm(~x)→ A(~x)] and~i ∈Nk .
The atomic formula A(~i ) must not be > (otherwise, ∀ has lost).
Then Ψ1(~i ), . . . ,Ψm(~i ) are added to U and A(~i ) is added to A .
The player ∃ chooses Ψ ∈U , Ψ=∀~y[Φ1(~y), . . . ,Φn(~y)→B(~y)]
and ~j ∈Nl such that B(~j ) ∈A (if this is impossible, then ∃ has lost).
V is changed into {Φ1(~j ), . . . ,Φn(~j )}.
∃ wins iff ∀ cannot play at some step (every formula of V ends with >,
in particular if V =;).
In fact, the player ∀ tries to build a model over N in which V0 is not satisfied
and ∃ tries to avoid this :
Theorem. i) Any modelM over N s.t. M 6|= V0 gives a winning strategy for ∀.
ii) There exists a strategy for ∃ with the following property : every play
that ∃ loses following this strategy, gives a modelM over N s.t. M 6|= V0.
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i) We define a strategy for ∀ such that, at each step, we have M 6|= V , M |=U and
every formula of A is false inM . This is true at the beginning of the game.
Thus, at each step, ∀ can choose Φ ∈ V such thatM |= ¬Φ.
Then Φ=∀~x[Ψ1(~x), . . . ,Ψm(~x)→ A(~x)] and ∀ can choose~i ∈Nk
such thatM |=Ψ1(~i ), . . . ,Ψm(~i ) and ¬A(~i ).
Then, ∀ adds Ψ1(~i ), . . . ,Ψm(~i ) to U and A(~i ) to A .
Thus, U and the negation of formulas of A remain true inM .
Then ∃ chooses Ψ ∈U , Ψ=∀~y[Φ1(~y), . . . ,Φn(~y)→B(~y)] and ~j ∈Nl
such that B(~j ) ∈A . Therefore, B(~j ) is false inM .
SinceM |=Ψ, the new set V = {Φ1(~j ), . . . ,Φn(~j )} is not satisfied byM .
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ii) The strategy for ∃ is as follows : fix an enumeration of all ordered pairs (Ψ,~j )
where Ψ=∀~y[Φ1(~y), . . . ,Φn(~y)→B(~y)] is a closed formula
and ~j is a finite sequence of integers of the same length as ~y .
At each step, ∃ chooses the first allowed pair (Ψ,~j ), not chosen before.
Consider a play which ∃ loses with this strategy. M is the model which satisfies
exactly the closed atomic formulas which are never put in A during the play.
A pair (Ψ,~j ) is called acceptable if Ψ is put is U and B(~j ) in A at some step
where B(~y) is the final atom of Ψ.
Every acceptable pair is effectively played by ∃ at some step : indeed, let (Ψ,~j ) be
the first counter-example . At some step during the play,Ψ and B(~j ) are respectively
in U and A and every acceptable pair before (Ψ,~j ) has been chosen by ∃.
At this moment, the strategy tells ∃ to play (Ψ,~j ).
We prove, by induction, thatM satisfies every formula Ψ which is put in U
and the negation of every formula Φ chosen by ∀ during the play.
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Proof for Ψ : The result is clear if Ψ is atomic because, if Ψ is both in U and A
then (Ψ,;) is acceptable and thus will be chosen by ∃ ; then ∃ wins.
Let Ψ=∀~y[Φ1(~y), . . . ,Φn(~y)→B(~y)]. We must show that
M |=Φ1(~j ), . . . ,Φn(~j )→B(~j ) for every ~j ∈Nk .
This is clear if B(~j ) is never put in A , becauseM |=B(~j ).
Otherwise, (Ψ,~j ) is acceptable and is chosen by ∃ at some step.
Then V = {Φ1(~j ), . . . ,Φn(~j )} and Φ1(~j ), for instance, is chosen by ∀.
By induction hypothesis, we haveM |= ¬Φ1(~j ), which gives the result.
Proof for Φ : Let Φ=∀~x[Ψ1(~x), . . . ,Ψm(~x)→ A(~x)] ; ∀ chooses~i
and puts A(~i ) in A and Ψ1(~i ), . . . ,Ψm(~i ) in U . By induction hypothesis,
M |=Ψ1(~i ), . . . ,Ψm(~i ) ; and, by definition,M 6|= A(~i ). ThusM |= ¬Φ.
It follows thatM 6|= V0 since, at the beginning of the play, ∀ chooses Φ ∈ V0.
QED
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Specification of first order formulas
For every closed first order formula Φ, we define an instruction κΦ and a set [Φ]⊂Π.
If Φ is atomic, Φ ≡ R~i , with ~i ∈ Nk , we choose a stack constant piΦ and we set
[Φ]= {piΦ} and also ‖Φ‖ = {piΦ}.
If Φ≡⊥ (resp. >), then [Φ]=Π (resp. ;). This settles the case when Φ is t0 6= t1.
In general, Φ=∀~x[Ψ1(~x), . . . ,Ψn(~x)→ A(~x)] where A(~x) is atomic.
The execution rule of κΦ is κΦ?ξ1 . . . . .ξn .piÂ ξ j ?ρ
where j ∈ {1, . . . ,n} and ρ ∈Π are defined in the following way :
the player ∃ first chooses~i ∈Nk (~x is of length k) such that pi ∈ [A(~i )].
If this is impossible, then ∀ wins.
Then, the player ∀ chooses j ∈ {1, . . . ,n} and a stack ρ ∈ [Ψ j (~i )].
In particular, the player ∀ loses when n = 0 or Ψ j (~i )≡>.
Finally we define [Φ]= {κ
Ψ1(~i )
. . . . .κ
Ψn(~i )
.pi;~i ∈Nk ,pi ∈ [A(~i )]}.
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A game is associated with each process p : p is performed and ∃ wins iff the execu-
tion terminates with κΦ?pi where Φ is the closure of an atomic formula and pi ∈ [Φ].
In other words, iff ∀ cannot play any more.
It is clear that this game is exactly the same as before, but the process plays the role
of ∃ for the choice of formulas ; ∃ still chooses the integers.
We shall see below that, by restricting formulas to the set int, the process will
completely replace the player ∃.
Lemma. Define ⊥ = {p; ∃ has a winning strategy for the game associated with p}.
Then, for each closed formula Φ, we have [Φ]⊂ ‖Φ‖ and κΦ ∥−Φ.
Proof by induction on Φ. The result is trivial if Φ is atomic.
If Φ=∀~x[Ψ1(~x), . . . ,Ψn(~x)→ A(~x)], by induction hypothesis, we have
κ
Ψ j (~i )
∥−Ψ j (~i ) and pi ∈ ‖A(~i )‖, which shows that [Φ]⊂ ‖Φ‖.
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Now, suppose that ξ j ∥−Ψ j (~i ) for 1 ≤ j ≤ n and that pi ∈ ‖A(~i )‖. We have to show
that κΦ?ξ1 . . . . .ξn .pi ∈⊥ , i.e. that ∃ has a winning strategy for the game associated
with this process. The strategy is first to choose this ~i . Then, we have pi ∈ [A(~i )]
because A(~i ) is atomic. After that, ∀ chooses j and ρ ∈ [Ψ j (~i )]. But, by the induction
hypothesis, we have ρ ∈ ‖Ψ j (~i )‖ and therefore ξ j ?ρ ∈ ⊥ . Now, ∃ can follow the
strategy for the game associated with the process ξ j ?ρ. QED
Corollary. If θ ∥−Φ for every ⊥ (in particular, if ` θ : Φ) and pi ∈ [Φ], then ∃ has a
winning strategy for the game defined by the process θ?pi.
If Φ is ∀~x[Ψ1(~x), . . . ,Ψn(~x)→ A(~x)] where A(~x) is atomic, then ∀ begins the play by
choosing~i ; then, the process θ?κ
Ψ1(~i )
. . . . .κ
Ψn(~i )
.piA(~i ) is started.
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A move of the play happens each time a constant κΦ comes in head position.
Then p= κΦ?ξ1 . . . . .ξn .piA and the process has already chosen, in place of ∃, the
formulas Φ and A. The player ∃ has only to choose the integers ~i . Then, ∀ chooses
j ∈ {1, . . . ,n} and a stack ρ ∈ [Ψ j (~i )] i.e. creates new constants of term and stack. The
process restarts with ξ j ?ρ.
This corollary allows to classify the proofs of Φ (and more generally the terms
which realize Φ) according to the strategies associated with them.
Examples.
i) θ =λz zλd ccz ∥−∃x∀y(Rx→Ry) i.e. ∀x[∀y(Rx→Ry)→⊥]→⊥.
A very simple game : ∃ chooses i ∈N or Rk in U ; ∀ chooses j and puts R j in A
and Ri in U . The strategy given by θ wins at the second move.
The proofs are characterized by a pair (m,n) ∈N2, with m ≤ n : n is the number of
moves and m is the choice of ∃ at the end of the play.
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ii) Y ∥−∀x{∀y(Ry→ x 6= sy),Rx→⊥}→∀x(Rx→⊥).
First, ∀ chooses n and puts Φ,Rn inU . In the general move, ∃ chooses Rp if possible
(Rp ∈U ∩A ) and wins ; or he chooses q ∈N. Then V = {∀y(Ry→ q 6= sy),Rq} ; thus
∀ may choose Rq and put it in A ; else, if q 6= 0, he may put R(q −1) in U .
The strategy for ∃ given by Y, is to always choose the last (and least) p such that
Rp ∈U .
Another winning strategy is to successively choose 0,1, . . . ,n. This forces ∀ to put
R0,R1, . . . ,Rn in A . Then ∃ can play Rn and win.
But this strategy does not correspond to any proof-like term. The reason is that,
during the execution of processes, the choices of ∀ appear only in index of κ-
instructions, and there is no mean to compute with them.
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Machine replaces man
We consider now a formula Φint, where Φ is 1st order. We use the notations
int(~x)→ F for int(x1), . . . ,int(xk)→ F and~i .pi for i1 . . . . . ik .pi.
We have Φint≡∀~x[int(~x),Ψint1 (~x), . . . ,Ψintm (~x)→ A(~x)] where A is atomic.
The game is exactly the same as for Φ.
We define, almost as before, the instructions κΦ and the set [Φ]⊂Π :
If Φ is atomic, we choose a stack constant piΦ and we set [Φ]= {piΦ}= ‖Φ‖.
If Φ≡⊥ (resp. >), then [Φ]=Π (resp. ;). This settles the case when Φ is t0 6= t1.
In general, Φ=∀~x[Ψ1(~x), . . . ,Ψn(~x)→ A(~x)] where A(~x) is atomic.
The execution rule of κΦ is : κΦ?~i .ξ1 . . . . .ξn .pi Â ξ j ?ρ ; ~i is a sequence of
integers of the form sr0 of the same length k as ~x , such that pi ∈ [A(~i )].
If this condition is not fulfilled, the execution loops indefinitely.
j ∈ {1, . . . ,n} and ρ ∈ [Ψ j (~i )] are chosen by ∀.
Finally we define [Φ]= {~i .Tκ
Ψ1(~i )
. . . . .Tκ
Ψn(~i )
.pi;~i ∈Nk ,pi ∈ [A(~i )]}.
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Machine replaces man (cont.)
During the execution of a process, the machine plays in place of ∃.
The process implements completely a strategy for ∃.
The following theorem gives a specification for Π11 consequences of Analysis.
Theorem. Let Φ be a closed 1st order formula. If θ ∥−Φint for every ⊥ (in particular,
if ` θ : Φint is provable in Analysis) and pi ∈ [Φ], then the process θ?pi plays a
winning strategy for ∃.
Examples. i) We have already given examples of the form [∃x∀y( f (x, y) 6= 0)]int.
ii) Consider Φ≡∀x[∀y(X y→ X sy),X0→ X x], which is not realized.
But Φint≡∀x[int(x),∀y(int(y),X y→ X sy),X0→ X x] is provable.
The game : first, ∀ chooses n and puts Xn in A and ∀y(X y→ X sy),X0 in U .
During the game, ∃ chooses Xp if possible (i.e. Xp ∈U ∩A ) and wins ;
or he chooses q such that Xsq ∈A and sets V = {X q}.
Then ∀ must choose X q and put it in A .
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Computing predecessor
At the beginning of the play, the player ∃ has no other choice
than to output n−1. Thus we have, for n > 0
θ?n .Tκ .κ0 .piÂ κ? (n−1) .ξ .η .pi. We have shown :
Theorem. Any proof of ∀x[∀y(X y→ X sy),X0→ X x]int gives a λ-term
which computes the predecessor function.
The simplest strategy for ∃ is to choose successively n−1,n−2, . . . ,0.
The simplest term θ =λmλ f λa(mλgλnλy((g )(s)n)( f )ny)00a
follows this strategy. It is obtained by proving
f :∀y(int(y),X y→ X sy)`λgλnλy((g )(s)n)( f )ny : F (x)→ F (sx)
with F (x)≡∀y[int(y),X y→ X (x+ y)].
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Remark. The formula Φ≡∀x[∀y(X y→ X sy),X0→ X x] cannot be realized,
although the game and the winning strategies are the same as for Φint.
The reason is that the integer n, chosen by ∀, appears in the processes
only as an index of a κ-instruction. It cannot be compared with 0.
The formula Φ′≡∀x[int(x),∀y(X y→ X sy),X0→ X x]
is (trivially) realized by I which checks if n = 0.
By proving Φint, we compute, in fact, a sequence of integers from n−1 to 0.
We can use the following simpler formula if we only want to compute
the predecessor : Φ0≡∀x(∀y X sy,X0→ X x).
We note that Φint0 is provable in Analysis.
Theorem. If θ ∥−Φint0 , then θ?n .Tκ .a .piÂ κ? (n−1) .pi for n > 0.
Same proof as before.
This can be generalized to compute other functions.
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Computing quotient
Consider, for example the following formula Φ :
∀x[∀y X7y,∀y X (7y+1), . . . ,∀y X (7y+6)→ X x]
Φint is provable in Analysis. Exactly the same method shows :
If θ ∥−Φint, then θ computes the quotient and the remainder by 7 ;
i.e. θ?n .Tκ0 . . . .Tκ6 .piÂ κr ?q .pi where n = 7q + r,0≤ r ≤ 6.
We can generalize a bit more, with the following useful trick :
Let a,b ∈N and X be a truth value.
Define the predicate a = b 7→ X as X if a = b and > if a 6= b.
Theorem (trivial). λxλy yx ∥−∀x∀y∀X {(x=y 7→ X )→ (x=y→ X )}
and λx xI ∥−∀x∀y∀X {(x=y→ X )→ (x=y 7→ X )}.
Thus, we can use x=y 7→X instead of x=y→X
at the cost of a little more code.
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Computing logarithm
Now consider the formula Φ :
∀x{∀y∀z∀u[2y=z+u+1→ X (2y + z)],X0→ X x}
which can be read as ∀x{∀y∀z[z < 2y → X (2y + z)],X0→ X x}.
Φ says that each integer has a logarithm, and Φint is provable in Analysis.
With the theorem above, any θ ∥−Φint is easily transformed into η ∥−Ψint with
Ψ≡∀x{∀y∀z∀u[2y=z+u+1 7→X (2y + z)],X0→ X x}
Consider a play with Φ (resp. Ψ). The player ∀ chooses n and puts
Xn in A , X0 and Φ′ (resp. Ψ′) in U . ∃ cannot choose X0.
Thus, ∃ chooses y,z,u such that n = 2y+z .
In the case of Φ, he has no other obligation. But, in the case of Ψ, he must satisfy
2y=z+u+1, otherwise he gets the formula > which is forbidden. Thus
Theorem. If η ∥−Ψint, then η computes the logarithm ;
i.e. η?n .Tκ .piÂ κ?p .q .r .pi′ with n = 2p +q and 2p = q+r+1.
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Well founded recursive relations
Let f :N2→N be recursive. The predicate f (x, y)= 1 is well founded
iff the formula ∀X∀z{∀x[∀y( f (x, y)= 1→ X y)→ X x]→ X z} is true in N.
We show that, in this case, this formula is even realized.
Theorem. If the predicate f (x, y)= 1 is well founded, then
Y ∥−∀X∀z{∀x[∀y( f (x, y)= 1 7→X y)→ X x]→ X z}.
Let t ∥−∀x[∀y( f (x, y) = 1 7→ X y) → X x] and n ∈ N ; we show by induction on n,
following the well founded predicate “ f (x, y)= 1 ”, that Yt ∥−Xn.
Since Yt ?piÂ t ?Yt .pi, it suffices to show that Yt ∥−∀y( f (n, y)= 1 7→ X y)
i.e. Yt ∥− f (n,p)= 1 7→ Xp . This is trivial if f (n,p) 6= 1
and this follows from the induction hypothesis if f (n,p)= 1.
Thus, if pi ∈ ‖Xn‖, we have t ?Yt .pi ∈⊥ and therefore Y? t .pi ∈⊥ . QED
This shows that a recursive well founded predicate is also well founded
in every realisability model.
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True Π11 formulas
But formulas provable in Analysis are not the only realized formulas.
Indeed, we have the remarkable property :
Theorem. If Φ is a true Π11 formula, then Φ
int is realized.
This shows, in particular, that the integers of the realizability models are elementary
equivalent to standard integers. It is not possible to show the independence of some
arithmetical (and even Π11) true formula by means of realizability models.
This leaves the possibility open for Σ11 (or more complicated) true formulas, a case
which is inaccessible to forcing methods, because of the Shoenfield theorem.
Sketch of proof.
Let Φ be a given Π11 formula. We have associated with Φ a game such that
Φ is true iff the “ trivial ” strategy for ∃ is winning.
The trivial strategy is to always play the first allowed move not already played.
94
True Π11 formulas (cont.)
Now let f (x, y)= 1 be the recursive predicate which says that
x, y are successive positions chosen by ∀ such that, between them,
∃ has applied the trivial strategy.
It is clear that this strategy is winning iff the predicate f (x, y) = 1 is well founded
(each play is finite, which means that every branch is finite).
Now, we have shown p. 92 that this predicate is well founded iff
Y ∥−∀X {∀x[∀y( f (x, y)= 1 7→ X y)→ X x]→∀x X x}.
But we have just proved that : “ f (x, y)= 1 is well founded” → Φ.
Let θ be a proof-like term associated with this proof. Then θY ∥−Φ. QED
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Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory
A first order theory. Its axioms can be classified in three groups :
1. Equality, extensionality, foundation.
2. Union, power set, substitution, infinity.
3. Choice ; possibly other axioms such as CH, GCH, large cardinals.
We can realize the first two groups by λc-terms,
i.e. no new instruction is necessary besides cc.
Curiously, equality and extensionality are the most difficult ones. For example,
the first axiom of equality ∀x(x = x) is realized by a λ-term τ
with the reduction rule : τ? t .piÂ t ?τ .τ .pi (fixed point of λxλ f f xx).
Therefore, we need to consider first a theory with a strong membership relation ε,
without extensionality ; in some sense, ∈ is defined by means of ε .
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ZFε set theory
Three binary symbols ∈,⊂ and ε (strong membership) ; x = y is x ⊂ y ∧ y ⊂ x .
• ”Definition” of ∈ and ⊂ :
∀x∀y[x ∈ y↔ (∃z ε y)x = z] ; ∀x∀y[x ⊂ y↔ (∀z εx)z ∈ y].
• Foundation : ∀a[(∀x εa)F (x)→ F (a)]→∀aF (a) (for every formula F ).
• Comprehension : ∀a∃b∀x[x εb↔ (x εa∧F (x))] ( ” )
• Pair : ∀a∀b∃x[a εx∧b εx]
• Union : ∀a∃b(∀x εa)(∀y εx) y εb.
• Power set : ∀a∃b∀x(∃y εb)∀z(z ε y↔ (z εa∧F (z,x))) ( ” )
• Collection : ∀a∃b(∀x εa)[∃y F (x, y)→ (∃y εb)F (x, y)] ( ” )
• Infinity : ∀a∃b{a εb∧ (∀x εb)[∃y F (x, y)→ (∃y εb)F (x, y)]} ( ” )
This theory is a conservative extension of ZF :
1. If ZFε` F (formula of ZF ), then ZF ` F : simply replace ε by ∈ in ZFε.
2. We must show that each axiom of ZF is a consequence of ZFε.
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ZFε set theory (cont.)
Example. ZFε ` a ⊂ a (and thus a = a).
By foundation, assume ∀x(x εa→ x ⊂ x) ; this gives ∀x(x εa→ x = x), thus
∀x[x εa→ (∃y εa)x = y], i.e. ∀x(x εa→ x ∈ a), and therefore a ⊂ a.
Now, we define realizability models for ZFε, which will therefore be also
realizability models for ZF. We only need to define ‖F‖ for atomic formulas F .
Of course, we start with a model of ZF, and we take as atomic formulas :
a 6εb, a ∉ b and a ⊂ a. Then define : ‖a 6εb‖ = {pi ∈Π; (a,pi) ∈ b}.
We check that all the axioms of ZFε, except the first, are realized, without knowing
the precise definition of ‖a ∉ b‖, ‖a ⊂ b‖, simply because they are defined in ZF.
Foundation. Y ∥−∀a[∀x(F (x)→ x 6εa)→¬F (a)]→∀a¬F (a).
This explains why we find Yλxλ f f xx ∥−∀x(x = x).
98
ZFε set theory (cont.)
Comprehension. For every set a and every formula F (x), set :
b = {(x, t .pi); (x,pi) ∈ a, t ∥−F (x)}. We easily get ‖x 6εb‖ = ‖F (x)→ x 6εa‖. It follows
that (I , I ) ∥−∀x[x 6εb↔ (F (x)→ x 6εa)].
Other axioms of ZFε are realized in the same way. For example :
Collection. Let a be a set, Cl (a) its transitive closure and F (x, y) a formula.
We set b =⋃{Φ(x, t )×Cl (a); x ∈Cl (a), t ∈Λc} with
Φ(x, t )= {y of minimum rank ; t ∥−F (x, y)}, or ; if there is no such y .
We show that ‖∀y(F (x, y)→ x 6εa)‖ ⊂ ‖∀y(F (x, y)→ y 6εb)‖. Indeed :
suppose t ∥−F (x, y), (x,pi) ∈ a. Then x,pi ∈Cl (a), and therefore :
(y ′,pi) ∈ b for some y ′ ∈Φ(x, t ) ; it follows that t ∥−F (x, y ′) and pi ∈ ‖y ′ 6εb‖. Therefore
t .pi ∈ ‖∀y(F (x, y)→ y 6εb)‖.
We have proved that I ∥−∀y(F (x, y)→ y 6εb)→∀y(F (x, y)→ x 6εa).
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ZFε set theory (cont.)
We must now realize the first axioms of ZFε and therefore define the truth values of
the atomic formulas : ‖a ∉ b‖, ‖a ⊂ b‖, where a,b vary in a given model of ZFC.
It would be nice to have :
‖a ∉ b‖ = ‖∀z(z ⊂ a,a ⊂ z→ z 6εb)‖ and ‖a ⊂ b‖ = ‖∀z(z ∉ b→ z 6εa)‖
because we should deduce immediately that I realizes the axioms we need.
Now ‖c 6εa‖ =; if rk(a)≤ rk(c). Thus, the above equations may be written as :
‖a ∉ b‖ =⋃rk(c)<rk(b)‖(c ⊂ a,a ⊂ c→ c 6εb)‖
‖a ⊂ b‖ =⋃rk(c)<rk(a)‖(c ∉ b→ c 6εa)‖ i.e.
‖a ∉ b‖ =⋃rk(c)<rk(b)Φ(a,b,c,‖c ⊂ a‖,‖a ⊂ c‖)
‖a ⊂ b‖ =⋃rk(c)<rk(a)Ψ(a,b,c,‖c ⊂ a‖,‖a ⊂ c‖)
where Φ,Ψ are functionals defined in ZF.
We simply observe now that this is a correct inductive definition
on the ordered pair of ordinals : (rk(a)∪ rk(b),rk(a)∩ rk(b)).
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ZFε set theory (cont.)
Remark. It is also possible to define the relations x ∉ y , x ⊂ y by formulas with the
only symbol 6ε and then to prove the first axioms of ZFε from the others axioms.
We cannot use induction to define these relations, because ordinals are not
definable in ZFε. But we can use coinduction.
Anyway, this method gives complicated λ-terms for the first axioms of ZFε
so that we prefer the above method.
Remark. The definition of t ∥−x ∉ y and t ∥−x ⊂ y is very similar to the defintion of
forcing. In fact, the generic models of set theory, which are defined in forcing, are
particular cases of realizability models.
Thus, the theory presented here gives completely new models of set theory.
The fact that forcing is a case of realizability, is used to find programs associated with
the axiom of choice and the continuum hypothesis. We build a model by combining
both methods ; we call this iterated realizability by analogy with iterated forcing.
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The full axiom of choice
We get a program for the axiom of dependent choice in the same way as in Analysis.
The problem for the full axiom of choice is more difficult. It has been solved recently
(not yet published). As a bonus, we get also the continuum hypothesis.
The proof is too long to be given here ; the result is as follows :
we need two new instructions χ and χ′ which appear inside
two very complex λ-terms, together with cc and the clock (or the signature).
The behaviour of these programs is not yet understood.
These new instructions χ, χ′ work on the bottom of the stack.
Their reduction rules is as follows :
χ? t .τ . t1 . . . tn .pi0Â t ? t1 . . . tn .τ .pi0
χ′? t . t1 . . . tn .τ .pi0Â t ?τ . t1 . . . tn .pi0
where pi0, as before, is a marker for the bottom of the stack.
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The axiom of choice (cont.)
In order to understand the behaviour of these new instructions, we consider
processes of the form <t ?pi, τ> where τ is a closed term.
The execution rules are as follows :
<tu?pi, τ>Â<t ?u .pi, α0τ> <λx t ?u .pi,τ>Â<t [u/x]?pi, α1τ>
<cc? t .pi, τ>Â<t ?kpi .pi, α2τ> <kpi? t .ρ, τ>Â<t ?pi, α3τ>
<χ? t .τ . t1 . . . tn .pi0, τ′>Â<t ? t1 . . . tn .τ′ .pi0, τ>
<χ′? t . t1 . . . tn .τ′ .pi0, τ>Â<t ?τ . t1 . . . tn .pi0, τ′>
The αi are fixed closed terms, which we shall not write explicitly here.
In fact, we get a parallel execution ; χ and χ′ are communication instructions.
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Conclusion
The conclusion is that we can translate every mathematical proof
into a program. We can execute this program in a lazy λ-calculus machine
extended with only four new instructions : cc, σ (or ħ), χ and χ′.
This machine can be implemented rather easily.
The challenge, now, is to understand all these programs,
first of all, the ones we obtained for the axioms of ZFC.
It is very plausible that we shall find, in this way, programs analogous
to the core of an operating system like Unix.
This would give a method to implement such a core on a very firm basis.
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